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Policing the New Europe—The Information
De cit
AMANDA HOEY and IVAN TOPPING
ABSTRACT The European police terrain comprises a jigsaw of different police
forces, judicial systems and information networks. Throughout Europe police
need information in order to do their job. Police detect very little crime themselves
but rely heavily on information from the public about the commission of crimes.
Also, in order to plan operations, surveillance or identify likely suspects in a
criminal investigation they will need information such as geographic details,
physical descriptions and the like. Technology can be used to enhance the
operational effectiveness of police forces by  rstly, allowing vast amounts of
information to be stored in readily accessible form, secondly, enabling the police
to deploy resources ef ciently and  nally, by aiding police forces in large scale
preservation of law and order. This article explores the extent to which the
European policing environment is being altered and contends that, as a result of
demands for increasingly sophisticated information and communication links, the
pace of technological development will have a direct impact on the nature of
policing in the ‘New Europe’.
Introduction
In the context of the new Europe, the exchange of security-related information will play a
crucial role in police co-operation and law enforcement. In many ways, computerised
communication, information storage and exchange have come to be seen as being at the
core of measures designed to counteract the ‘security de cit’ in the new Europe.1 This
article seeks to highlight some of the dif culties involved in the daily routine of information
exchange which does or will take place under the aegis of co-operative European policing
structures. This will be done through an analysis of existing mechanisms for police
co-operation and their effectiveness, coupled with an exploration of the extent to which
‘informatization’ will, at a European level, affect both the support for the core functions of
policing and the practice of policing. The further issue of legal and practical problems
connected with the harmonisation and integration of European security systems and
information technology will be addressed.
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The European Context
In the European context, ‘crime’ is taken to encompass a diverse range of criminal
activities. Commonly, references occur to such matters as terrorism, drugs traf cking and
money laundering. In spite of the trans-national nature of international crime, the  ght
against such forms of criminality has traditionally been state based or conducted via
international structures for co-operation constructed on an ad hoc or temporary basis.
During the post second world war and Cold War periods, the issue of international crime
was not highly rated on the political agenda but a series of terrorist attacks in Europe, the
Middle East and the US during the 1970s and 1980s provided the impetus for enhanced
co-operation between the European states and convinced them of the need for a more
permanent and structured form of international co-operation. In particular, issues such as
drug traf cking and money laundering were increasingly viewed as international problems
which, as such, could only be effectively tackled at that level. The two mechanisms
traditionally associated with combating international crime are bilateral agreements be-
tween two nations and the setting-up of multi-national organisations by participating
states. It has been asserted that these ‘traditional methods of international crime control are
being rendered ineffective by the evolution of the European Union (EU) away from the state
system’. 2
European Police Co-operation—Major Structures
Since the 1970s, police co-operation and law enforcement in Europe, as elsewhere in the
international community, was conducted largely on a reactive and non-permanent basis,
with European security initiatives tending to fall somewhere between national and global
levels of security co-operation. With the creation of the Single European Market, in which,
ideally, all physical and  scal barriers have been removed, there have been and continue to
be obvious rami cations for policing Europe and for European security structures.
Rati cation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked the beginning of a new stage
in process of European integration, with the third pillar of the TEU being concerned with
European-wide co-operation on justice and home affairs. In particular, the provisions of
Title VI (Article K) of the TEU have had a signi cant impact on law enforcement and
police co-operation in Europe.
Within the European State, law and order are becoming issues calling for increased
attention. Traditionally, policing activities have been located within each member state but
change has occurred with the development of non-state forms of policing at supra-state
level within the EU. In particular, steps towards a common security structure have been
strengthened through the creation of two devices to achieve commonality and co-operation
in European policing—the signing of an agreement for a co-operative European regional
police venture (based to a degree on Interpol), known as Europol,3 and the earlier attempt
to create an internally borderless Europe through the Schengen Agreement.4
Europol
Although the UK rati ed the creation of Europol in December 1996, it could not be
described as enthusiastic about further extending its remit, taking the view that a fully
operational cross-border police force is neither necessary nor desirable. The UK perception
is that Europol will simply exist as a complement to Interpol and should focus on serious
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international crime within a more closely de ned geographical area, having a capacity to
develop and analyse intelligence.
The 1995 Europol Convention set out those areas in which Europol would be involved—
drugs traf cking, trade in human beings, motor vehicle crime, money laundering, and
traf cking in nuclear and radioactive substances. Somewhat surprisingly, terrorism is not
currently on this list, but is expected to be added in the near future.
One of the key differences between Europol and its forerunners lies in the fact that
Europol has a legislative mandate. In this sense, it is embedded within the existing
constitutional structure of the Union. As one commentator has put it, Europol ‘is built into
the masonry of the Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs policy, which, alongside the
First Pillar of the original EEC and the Second Pillar of a common foreign and security
policy, supports the entire legal edi ce of the European Union’. 5
Schengen—the new tensions
However, inevitably, these latest developments have created tensions between the newer
Europol security structures and longer established attempts at European security co-oper-
ation. In particular, the Schengen Agreement has generated comment and criticism. This
Agreement was originally drawn up in 1985, and purports to operate a borderless Europe
in a block of nine European countries, the internal borders of which are contiguous. This
is an ideal to which Europe has long aspired, but the practicalities of implementation have
meant that the Agreement—although rati ed by the signatories in 1995—is still some way
from achieving the ideal of a fully borderless Europe.
Most strikingly, unlike the majority of EU states that have signed the Schengen
Agreement, the UK and Ireland remain outside the Schengen community and are not
members. They take the view that free movement of citizens within the EU area—one of
the four main elements of the internal market as laid down by the Single European Act of
1987—should be possible only for EU nationals, but not for non-EU nationals. This stance
would obviously require a two-tier system of movement control to deal with EU and
non-EU nationals travelling across frontiers within the Schengen area, which is not
currently the case. It is on this interpretation of their EU treaty obligations that the
maintenance of UK and Irish border controls is based, causing these two EU member
countries to be out of line with their colleagues and at variance with the Schengen ideal.
The reality is that although border controls continue to operate at external Schengen
frontiers, travel inside the Schengen group of countries is not, in the main, subject to the
degree of restriction or check that was once the case. Greece, together with the Scandina-
vian group of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, are likely future participants in the Schengen
ideal, although obviously their frontiers are not in some cases directly contiguous with the
frontiers of the other Schengen signatories.
One of the positive aspects of the Schengen Agreement has been the initiation of joint
European security operations directed against organised crime, illegal immigrants and
drugs, and while the Schengen-driven process of security co-operation at national level does
not on the surface include the UK, the Prime Minister in fact negotiated the right to opt
into the European system at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. So, in effect, the UK
national system is attempting to keep a foot in both camps by buying into and co-operating
with the Schengen system. The effect is to attempt to extract the maximum bene t from
Schengen but without at the same time relinquishing the right to continue to operate
external border controls with Europe. This willingness for involvement in European
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security matters has the obvious merit of showing a wish to co-operate with European
partners—sometimes seen to be lacking in other areas—and the consequent implications
for the UK’s relationship with Europol.
Current Dif culties
Unfortunately, the idealism of implementing Schengen in Europe has coincided with a
number of major political, social and economic upheavals. These include the ending of the
Cold War in Europe, the opening of borders with those central and eastern European states
which had previously been sealed, increasing lawlessness and the collapse of the soviet-bloc
economies. This in turn has led to increasing problems with drug traf cking, organised
crime and movements of economic and, indeed, political migrants from these areas. Until
recently, Schengen has managed both conceptually and practically to survive this dif cult
period. One of the key factors in the continued survival and stability of Schengen has been
due to the full use made of the Schengen Information Service (SIS). This is a database
containing many different categorisations of information—such as descriptions of people
and objects missing or wanted in the Schengen countries—which can be accessed at any
time by police or customs; but in recent months, the system has become in danger of simply
being overwhelmed. For example, the latest waves of largely economic refugees from
Albania and from Kurdish areas in the Middle East who are entering Europe via Italy are
threatening the very existence of Schengen and causing sharp political differences between
Italy, as the country of entry, and its Schengen neighbours, particularly France and
Germany. Essentially, the Schengen ideal is being tested and found wanting due to the
policing and border-control problems caused by Italy’s long external coastline and, of
course, its liberal asylum laws.
A Borderless Europe and Security Co-operation
At the European level, we have witnessed the development of a ‘borderless Europe’, in
which it is asserted that crime will know no boundaries and national police forces will lack
the necessary control to maintain law and order. The implications of a ‘Europe without
Frontiers’ are manifold. For our purposes, two implications are particularly signi cant.
First, there appears to be a general perception that in a borderless Europe, crime control
will simply be more dif cult and, consequently, crime will rise.6 For example, in the of cial
German police criminal statistical analysis for 1993, it was claimed that ‘the increased
permeability of Europe’s internal borders’ was one factor for increased crime rates.7 This
obviously raises the issue of just how symbolic borders within the New Europe actually
are.8
Second, there are signi cant implications for communications and information technol-
ogy. One of the main objectives of the European Union’s common foreign and security
policy is to ‘strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways’. In line
with the objectives of the TEU, we have witnessed the development of European-based
groups that are crucial to the emerging security structure of the new Europe, but in spite
of this, state sovereignty is still maintained in the criminal justice  eld. Member states have
been reluctant to cede sovereignty and instead have opted for enhanced co-operation and
information exchange as a means of strengthening European security. As police of cers do
not have operational powers within another country, the emphasis falls ‘on the exchange
of police information between forces as being the bedrock of co-operation’. 9 Technological
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development has paved the way for advanced systems of police co-operation throughout
Europe. In fact, the widespread proliferation of computerised databases has led to asser-
tions that ‘there are almost as many proposed or recently established international
information systems as there are international police agencies’.10
Good communications are a necessary precondition for ef cient and effective police
co-operation. As has been observed ‘it is clear that police computerisation and the
collection, storage and use of personal information has its own separate trajectory’. 11 It
appears that this ‘informatization’ of police work may have a role to play in predicting the
developing role of policing the new Europe. The extent to which the boundaries of
the previously clearly de ned security systems have become redrawn is obviously a matter
of great concern. This must cause scrutiny of the way in which the combined effect
of information technology and the process of informatization has contributed to the
redrawing of boundaries and new initiatives in trans-national forms of police co-operation.
Communications and Information Exchange
Information is identi ed as a resource that has been facilitated by computerisation. In
policing the ‘New Europe’, it is contended that the demand for increasingly sophisticated
information and communication links coupled with the pace of technological development
will alter the environment in which policing is conducted. Traditional methods of policing
will no longer be capable of adequately preventing crime and maintaining law and order.
As European security jurisdiction evolves and redraws the existing boundaries, there will be
an enhanced need for reliable high-grade information on an increasing scale.
Current Information Exchange Systems
As already mentioned, practical police co-operation leaves existing national police powers
untouched. Co-operation may encompass several areas such as training, observation and
information exchange. For our purposes, the latter is the most signi cant. The current
information exchange system comprises both international and national structures, as well
as speci c trans-national structures. The most formalised structures comprise, at the
international level, INTERPOL, the multilateral crime- ghting organisation; nationally, we
have special law enforcement units and at the European level there is Schengen and
Europol. This section looks at the role of each of these agencies and the extent to which
information technology assists in the policing functions of these organisations.
Interpol
Interpol is essentially a global police information and intelligence exchange system. Interpol
does not conduct criminal investigations itself but, rather, national police forces can
conduct international investigations through Interpol. Currently, over one million messages
are transmitted through the Interpol network each year and it is estimated that almost half
of Interpol’s work relates to Europe.12 The communication structure is three-fold, compris-
ing a central station, regional stations and national stations. The core function of Interpol
is to provide information to national police forces in the form of ‘international notices’.
There are  ve of these notices (see Table 1) which contain information relating to physical
descriptors of individuals, the types of crimes that individual is suspected of having
committed, photographs,  ngerprints and details of criminal records.
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Table 1. Table of international notices
Wanted (red) Request for the arrest of an individual for extradition
Enquiry (blue) Request for information concerning a named individual; for example,
previous conviction, details of movements, etc.
Warning (green) Alerts other police forces about individuals
Missing person (yellow) Provides details of missing persons
Unidenti ed body (black) Contains physical description of individuals and any other relevant
details
Interpol has been subject to much criticism on the basis that it is excessively bureau-
cratic, the procedure for requests is cumbersome and slow, and security appears to be
somewhat lacking.13 Despite this poor image, Interpol has achieved pre-eminence in
international policing circles and, since 1987, the implementation of an extensive comput-
erisation programme has meant a major overhaul for the organisation. Its present Criminal
Information System (CIS) was introduced in 1987 in order to:
· improve methods of storing and retrieving information on crimes and criminals
· speed up replies to NCB inquiries
· give the Interpol Police Division immediate, direct access to the computerised  les14
The CIS includes  les on names, drug seizures, counterfeit currency and property. Other
developments such as the Electronic Archive System and an Automated Search Facility have
led commentators to conclude that Interpol now has ‘one of the most sophisticated
automated search and image transmission systems in the world. It enables rapid, reliable
and secure information exchange of information. NCB’s will have access to an enormous
store of data … the idea that Interpol is just a “letter-box” is clearly out of date.’15It
appears that Interpol will no longer be content to act merely as a clearing house for
information, and the development of the Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit (ACIU)
implies that Interpol intends to stay at the fore of enhancing international police
co-operation.
Schengen Information System
Schengen may be regarded as the most complete system of police co-operation in Europe.
The rationale behind Schengen is to strengthen collaboration between Member states. In
order to do this, there is a need for comprehensive exchange of information and thus was
born the SIS. The SIS does not link systems (as does Interpol), rather this is a completely
new register based in Strasbourg which comprises information held on a central databank
drawn from national  les on crimes and criminals. Schengen is unique in the sense that, for
the  rst time, we have a detailed Convention (comprising some 143 articles) providing rules
on the use of a computerised information system with integral data-protection provisions.
The purpose of the SIS is to maintain public order and security, and for use in connection
with the movement of persons (Article 93). The system comprises six categories of data  le
with entries on:
· persons who are wanted for arrest for extradition purposes
· aliens (i.e. non-EU citizens)
· missing persons
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· persons under covert surveillance
· objects sought for the purposes of seizure
Generally, the information held on the SIS is to be used only by authorities responsible for
border checks and other police and customs checks carried out within the member state,
and the co-ordination of such checks. Each country has its own national database referred
to as SIRENES (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries) which is
linked to Strasbourg. Each one follows a similar format and an information report on an
individual by national police can only contain the following information:
· name
· physical descriptors





· reason for the report
· action to be taken
Collection of information on individuals’ racial origin, religious beliefs, sexual behaviour
and membership of organisations is prohibited under the terms of the Convention. The
convention also sets ‘default’ levels of data protection, to the extent that member states
must have levels of data protection equivalent to those contained in the 1981 Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data and the Council of Europe Recommendation (97)15 Regulating the Use
of Personal Data in the Police Sector. Information may also only be used for the purpose
it was gathered and individuals have a right to access information held on them (Article
109). This right of access is constrained by the fact that it must be done in accordance with
the national law of the state in which it is requested. Also, the reporting state has the right
to contest the matter. There is no mention of how this legal challenge is to work and how
any differences between requesting and reporting states should be resolved. The right of
access is balanced against protecting the rights of others and covert surveillance. If an
individual  nd out that inaccurate data is held on him then he has the right to have it
deleted. Thus, for example, if a French court rules that an SIS report recorded by the Italian
authorities is unlawful, then such a report must be deleted. However, the Convention does
not provide for a direct remedy to be available at either national or supranational level.
The UK has consistently refused to become a signatory to the Convention but, recently,
backing has been given for European initiatives to crack down cross-border crime and is set
to contribute to the SIS.
Europol
Europol has been likened to a pan-European FBI which ‘represents the most ambitious plan
yet conceived for an independent policing capacity at EU level’.16 Unlike Interpol, which has
been condemned many times as nothing more than an international letterbox, Europol’s
remit is to provide a system of information exchange which is designed to combat and
prevent organised crime in Europe.
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Drugs traf cking and related crime in particular, as one of the original listed areas, has
been accorded the highest priority, with a Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) having been set up
as early as 1993, in the period prior to the actual rati cation of the creation of Europol. The
EDU is now incorporated within the Europol structure, and is a non-operationa l unit
concerned primarily with the exchange of information and intelligence. Unlike the other
systems, the EDU holds ‘soft’ information which may include innuendo or unveri able
facts.
EDU has recently been asked to run several projects concerned with illegal immigration
networks. As Lewis points out ‘the EU is faced with mass immigration from a potential 700
million people in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Western Asia’. This
phenomenon of mass immigration has been caused by a variety of factors, such as the
collapse of state structures in the former USSR, recessions in countries bordering on the EU
and the opening up of formerly sealed borders. So, whereas of cial immigration channels
into Europe have largely been closed off, such channels have now been replaced by illegal
immigration networks. Immigration is a sensitive issue on the political agenda, and
increasingly has been recognised as something that should be dealt with on a co-operative
basis. Europol is a relatively recent development and it will be interesting to see how it
works in practice. The UK has taken a leading role in this new agency and was the  rst
member state to achieve the setting up of a National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)
through which contact with Europol takes place. As the NCIS Director General Albert
Pacey pointed out, ‘Europol offers UK law enforcement another avenue through which to
pursue international criminals who do not stop at national borders in their pursuit of
pro t’.
Informatization: pros and cons
Technology can be used in order to enhance the operational effectiveness of the police by
allowing vast amounts of information to be stored in readily accessible form, enabling the
police to deploy resources ef ciently and,  nally, by aiding the police in large-scale
preservation of law and order. In the new Europe, information technology acts as a
facilitator in adjusting the shape of the internal security  eld. The implications of this are
manifold and problems such as accountability, privacy and security of information arise.
Changes in European policing and security issues will necessarily impact on the UK and
traditional methods of policing. The increased demand for information and communication
links may lead to increased information-based police work compared with the traditional
concerns of the member states’ police forces, not least the UK. There is an implication that
this process of ‘informatization’ will alter the tactical context of information and is likely
to structure further harmonisation and integration of existing security systems.
The process of ‘informatization’ brings with it concurrent legal and practical problems
which need to be addressed. The practical problems include secure networks, communi-
cation standards, co-operation in major international investigations and contingency plan-
ning. The legal problems include the governance of systems for information exchange, with
a particular emphasis on data-protection regulations.17
The computerised databases which have been discussed in this paper represent powerful
instruments of control, which, it is asserted are required to combat the ‘external threats’
facing the new Europe. While many may applaud such systems, it is imperative to realise
that the risk of abuse increases dramatically, the more dense the links become. Commenta-
Policing the New Europe 509
tors have identi ed several problems associated with the abuse of computerised
information storage and exchange systems. These problems can be summarised as follows.
· False information can be more widely disseminated. There have been various reports
of inaccurate information exchange; for example, the incident of Mr Williams (not his
real name) who, while on a football trip to Belgium, was branded a football hooligan,
held for over 16 hours, strip searched and photographed. This action by the Belgium
police was instigated on the basis of inaccurate information relayed to the NCIS
(relating to an incident in 1990 of disorderly behaviour in which Mr Williams had not
been involved) which was then sent back to the Belgium authorities at the time of the
second incident in 1992. On his return to the UK, Mr Williams submitted a Data
Protection Subject Access Request regarding the information held by the NCIS. This
request identi ed the fact that inaccurate information had been recorded, which
ultimately led to an infringement of Mr Williams’ privacy and individual rights.18
· Subject access to the information held on the systems is restricted. This is largely due
to the con dentiality of the systems and variations in national data-protection laws. In
this context, member states may be able to derogate from subject access requests on
the grounds of national security, crime prevention and public safety.19 Discrepancies
between Member states’ data-protection regimes or even the lack of data-protection
provisions also gives rise to concern. The need for a speci c European data-protection
regime has been recognised in the form of the EU Directive on Data Protection20 with
an implementation date of October 1998 but, again, similar derogations apply.
· ‘Informatization’ may lead to increased objectivity. The danger is that when bare
information is relayed trans-nationally via computer terminals, the receiver of that
information may act objectively without consideration of the wider operational
context relating to the collection of such information, which many would argue is
crucial for competent interpretation.
· Lack of democratic accountability and legislative mandate. From where do these
systems derive their legitimacy? If we accept that one means of determining the
legitimacy of the communication systems is by way of a legislative mandate and
democratic accountability, then we need to examine the current structure in order to
assess whether or not this exists. Within the remit of the European institutions,
policing has no legislative mandate; for example, Interpol stands alone for its lack of
statutory legitimacy. Trevi (the forerunner to Europol) operated without the EC
Treaty framework. The Schengen treaties are international agreements over which the
European Court of Justice has no jurisdiction. Interpol and Schengen lack accountabil-
ity to a separate agency, and while Europol operates under a sophisticated regulatory
framework, if it were, in the long-term, to ‘acquire operational powers … what would
be required as well as a detailed set of procedural rights would be a special complaints
process and tribunal through which such rights could effectively be vindicated’. 21
Democratic accountability is necessary to ensure against complacency and the current
opaqueness of the internal decision-making process. It also secures the legitimacy of
the systems and overcomes suspicion between Member states.
Conclusion
In assessing the effectiveness of current European policing mechanisms, several dif culties
become apparent. First, the nature and extent of organised crime is largely unknown or not
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agreed upon. Second, European policing comprises a myriad of initiatives with little
empirical data on which to assess the performance of these initiatives. Finally, there appears
to be no clear statement of the EU police function at supranational level, despite the need
to take into account the fusion of national and cross-national factors.
However, it would appear that there is a general consensus that there is clearly a need
for an effective system of European police co-operation. Now that ‘justice and home
affairs’ is  rmly embedded as the third pillar of the EU, it is contended that European law
enforcement will be at the very heart of the process of European integration. The
implications of a European police state will necessarily comprise growing internal surveil-
lance and increased cross-border exchange of information. In this context, the ‘hard end of
crime control gives way to ensuring access, storage and retrieval of knowledge’.22 Comput-
ers in European policing will thus continue to expand for various reasons.
On a political level, it has been recognised that technology acts as a facilitator in
achieving the goal of enhanced information exchange. The co-ordination of information is
seen as vital for the security of the EU as the nature of police tasks change. In a borderless
Europe, increased terrorism, drug traf cking and illegal immigration are factors that have
to be dealt with. The spontaneous security structures that have attempted to address these
problems, such as Schengen and Europol, rely predominantly on data collection, retrieval
and analysis of information.
Policing lies at the heart of any order and thus security matters will be paramount on a
European level. A European police state would necessarily require rapidly communicated,
secure accessible information and, in this context, it is contended that information
technology will have a pivotal role to play in the practice of policing the new Europe as
security jurisdiction changes and evolves.
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